

## INTELLIGENCE AND US FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954\*

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The point has been made that there exists inherent tension between history and intelligence. Historians seek to reveal, to clarify. Intelligence requires secrecy to accomplish its purposes. Until recently, the literature of intelligence has been an unattractive commodity for historians, ranging from pro CIA institutional advertising to sensational and emotional denunciations. It has been the realm of journalists and theoreticians, often tendentious, and seldom resting on a firm documentary foundation.

On the bright side, historians and intelligence specialists have much in common. Both feel that they are keener than other people, possessed of a unique approach to interpreting human affairs that provides them with the capacity for exceptional understanding. There is additional common ground. Practitioners of both disciplines are frequently successful because they are able to analyze. They have a common thirst for and respect for the facts, and a healthy skepticism that produces a reliability less often found in other disciplines.

Historians have had a preeminent role in US intelligence from OSS to the present, and intelligence specialists have produced great history. One need only think of William Langer, Sherman Kent, Raymond Sontag, Ray Cline, and Everett Gleason.

Diplomatic history has now pushed out the edge of the envelope, as they say in the *Right Stuff*, to approximately 1954. The early postwar statesmen have written their memoirs and passed on. The official record is largely published and the preponderance of archival sources is now open for research at the National Archives, presidential libraries, and in private collections. Interpretation of the origins of the Cold War has experienced traditional, revisionist, and post-revisionist phases. Scores of well-documented monographs have appeared treating subjects of the 1945-54 period.

There remains the task of incorporating an appreciation of the role of intelligence into historical understanding of the period. Important sources are at last available to make this possible. Ray Cline's *The CIA: Reality vs. Myth* and Anne Karalekas' *History of the Central Intelligence Agency* provide excellent overviews. George Constantinides' *Intelligence and Espionage*, an outstanding 1983 analytical bibliography, discusses some fifty books that pertain to 1945-1954. Thomas Troy's *Donovan and the CIA* is a roadmap for intelligence sources for 1945-1947 as well as the wartime period. *Foreign Relations* volumes for the 1950s contain abundant finished intelligence. A new wave of memoirs by former intelligence officials includes works by William Colby,

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Card Meyer, Peter De Silva, David Alice Phillips, Joseph Burckholder Smith, Harry Rositzke, and Kermit Roosevelt

Some one thousand feet of records of the Office of Strategic Services and successor organizations have been open for some time among the holdings of the National Archives. NARS has now received from CIA an additional three thousand feet of operational records for 1941-1947. The National Security Agency has retired a series of "Special Research Histories," some of which deal in part with the postwar period. Substantial military intelligence for the 1940s is now available, including reports of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Military Information Division. Other pertinent NARS collections include National Security Council records containing some intelligence related reports and a vast collection of OSS and State Department intelligence research papers.

The Truman Library may offer the richest source of declassified intelligence material now available, particularly in the President's Secretary's File. The intelligence portion of the PSF offers hundreds of Office of Research and Evaluation reports, CIA Reviews of the World Situation, National Intelligence Estimates, and Korean War intelligence. The PSF also includes records of NSC meetings with intelligence components. Intelligence documentation at the Eisenhower Library is less concentrated and less completely declassified, but constitutes an essential source. Numerous intelligence documents across the government have been released under the Freedom of Information Act since 1974.

Given this substantial body of available material, it is appropriate to consider the relationship of sources to particular topics, develop some general and tentative substantive conclusions, and offer methodological suggestions for relating intelligence to the overall study of US foreign policy in the first decade of the postwar era.

#### **1945-1947**

President Truman abolished the Office of Strategic Services less than two months after the end of the war on the recommendation of the Bureau of the Budget. This decision was consistent with the hostility of the military services, the Department of State, and Congress to centralized intelligence. Research and analysis was transferred to State where, as Dean Acheson puts it in his memoirs, the Department muffed its intelligence role. Opposition within State to unified intelligence resulted in fragmentation, even at the Foggy Bottom level. When a Central Intelligence Group was established in early 1946 it operated under the direction and at the pleasure of Army, Navy, and State via a National Intelligence Authority. President Truman received a daily intelligence summary from CIG as well as military reports and a daily from State, but no unified, coordinated product.

During 1946 and 1947 the US Government addressed the intelligence problem in the context of the need for a coherent national security policy mechanism. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and study groups commissioned by him took the lead in developing plans that led to the National Security Act and establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. The process

whereby General Donovan's dream of a unified intelligence organization was realized is described in great detail in Thomas Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*. Tom Braden's article on the birth of the CIA in the February 1977 issue of *American Heritage* is an outstanding short treatment.

The paramount historical question of the two years from Tokyo Bay to the creation of the National Security Council is the origins of the Cold War. Until recently, scholarship had little basis upon which to evaluate the intelligence reaching the President and other top policymakers regarding the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. Melvyn Leffler's meticulously researched article appearing in the April 1984 issue of the *American Historical Review*, reflecting intelligence reports from the President's Secretary's File at the Truman Library and Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff intelligence materials from the National Archives, is evidence that evaluation is underway. It seems likely that Truman found ominous indeed the intelligence that crossed his desk, some of it virtually unprocessed, much of it military, and none of it the result of government-wide coordination. In this sense the inadequacy of the US intelligence system either exacerbated US-Soviet misunderstanding or fortuitously contributed to the President's inclination to take strong and prudent measures, depending on one's estimate of the nature of the Soviet threat that existed at the time. The failure of the Baruch Plan and initial postwar arms control negotiations should also be reappraised in light of new intelligence sources. The lack of US capability to assess Soviet forces or to provide verification of whatever agreements might have been reached certainly was a negative factor.

#### 1947-1950

The creation of the National Security Council structure in 1947 and the establishment of the CIA improved US intelligence, but not as rapidly or completely as one might expect. A series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), now declassified, sought to coordinate the government-wide effort and define responsibilities. However, the Departments dominated the new CIA much as they had CIC. Admiral Hillenkoetter, the first Director of Central Intelligence, lacked the clout to assert the prerogatives of the new organization. The National Security Act specified that CIA should coordinate national intelligence, but instead it produced its own reports through its Office of Research and Evaluation. ORE reports did find their way to the White House and NSC, but were of uneven quality and influence. Admiral Hillenkoetter transmitted intelligence information directly to the President, but it came in a virtually unevaluated form. Ray Cline recalls personally working in 1949 on CIA's "Review of the World Situation" which received high-level distribution but was based exclusively on what could be pieced together from the work of regional analysts, augmented by a reading of the newspapers.

Nor was CIA effectively plugged into the national security structure. Hillenkoetter, and indeed Truman, seldom attended NSC meetings. US intelligence was badly surprised by the Soviet atomic test of 1949. The CIA contribution to the development of NSC 68 was largely confined to the efforts of a single representative. CIA reports provided long-range warning of the attack

on South Korea, but were not pointed enough to earn notice. The US intelligence community fell victim to total surprise in June 1950 in the tactical sense. When the NSC convened to formulate the US response to the North Korean assault, the Director of Central Intelligence was not present, nor did he or other CIA officials play a visible role in the decision-making process.

In the 1947-1950 period, State Department intelligence made considerable progress. Secretary Marshall restored the centralized system under an Assistant Secretary-level Special Assistant for Intelligence. State's intelligence entity produced a significant amount of research and briefed Department officials regularly. It is less clear that it performed an important role in the government-wide process.

As has been established by congressional reports, memoirs of intelligence veterans, and monographs published on the basis of documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the United States initiated a program of covert operations in 1948 with the objective of countering Soviet subversive activities. Inspired by officials in State and the national military establishment, this program was implemented under the direction of CIA's Office of Policy Coordination. OPC operated with guidance from State and Defense outside of the CIA chain of command. It was not a rogue elephant nor was it subject to direct White House control. Programs were rather limited in scope initially, concentrating on support for democratic elements in Western Europe. While the overall configuration of this activity is now known, operational details are likely to remain classified for an extended period.

### 1950-1953

The outbreak of the Korean War resulted in massive strengthening of US intelligence comparable to the military rearmament that occurred. President Truman appointed General Walter Bedell Smith Director of Central Intelligence effective October 1950. Smith's tenure began inauspiciously with the failure of the intelligence community to predict Chinese intervention in November and the DCI's statement to top policy makers at the darkest moment of the ensuing crisis that the United States should withdraw from Korea. But Eisenhower's World War II Chief of Staff brought new vigor, prestige, and organizational ability to American intelligence, and was supported by enormous new resources. Seeking to accomplish CIA's original purpose, the preparation of integrated national intelligence, he implemented many of the reform proposals contained in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report prepared for the NSC, "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," 1 January 1949, now declassified. He summoned distinguished historian and OSS veteran William L. Langer from Harvard to establish an Office of National Estimates that would provide National Intelligence Estimates based on information obtained by the entire intelligence community. Although the value of the NIEs and other integrated intelligence reports of the 1950s has been questioned in light of their lowest-common-denominator character wrought by a government-wide clearance process, they were a vast improvement over the previous product.

The Korean War brought the National Security Council system to life. The NSC met far more frequently after June 1950. Information was provided, and there was always a place at the table for General Smith. CIA participated fully in the NSC committee system and contributed to its numbered reports.

The conduct of special operations and psychological warfare increased during the Korean period on a scale at least comparable to the expansion of intelligence research and analysis. The President established a Psychological Strategy Board in April 1951. CIA supported foreign broadcast operations, expanded. Covert support for democratic and anti-communist elements in Europe intensified and similar efforts were launched in other parts of the world. Much on the US organization for such activities and knowledge of the existence of particular programs is already in the public domain, but historians are unlikely to have access to operational records in the foreseeable future.

#### 1953-1954

When President Eisenhower took office, US intelligence had already achieved a measure of maturity as the result of the achievements of General Smith. As illustrated in Stephen Ambrose's *Decision in Space*, the incoming President had great respect for the value of intelligence as the result of his experience as a military commander. His insistence on formal, orderly, and extensive staff work resulted in an unparalleled reliance on the NSC system. With John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, Bedell Smith now Under Secretary, and Allen Dulles Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence component was fully integrated into foreign policy. Smith's presence gave State new authority and responsibilities in intelligence matters. Intelligence research and analysis continued to improve at CIA with another historian, Sherman Kent, succeeding Langer as Director of the Office of National Estimates. Many NIEs and Special Estimates (SNIEs) of the period appear in the *Foreign Relations* series volumes for 1952-1954, for instance in the recently released volume on Korea. Debate continues on the utility of these estimates, but not on the effort put into them or the extent to which they were read throughout government. *The Soviet Estimate* by John Prados provides a highly significant analysis based on NIEs and other intelligence materials obtained under FOIA for the period beginning in the 1950s.

It is well known that under Eisenhower the United States vigorously pursued a program of covert activities around the world to counteract Soviet influence and to support governments and forces deemed sympathetic to US interests. As a former OSS operative in the field, Allen Dulles accorded this area of intelligence a high priority. The special operations of the Eisenhower Administration included continuation of the funding of friendly elements abroad, foreign broadcasting, and on occasion the use of force to influence events. These operations were conducted within the national security framework of the US Government. Some documents such as NSC 5412 of 1954 setting forth procedures governing the conduct of covert operations have been declassified.

The two most prominent covert operations of the period were the toppling of regimes in Iran and Guatemala by indigenous opponents with the

support of the CIA. Much valuable material has been made available on both incidents, including scholarly monographs based on FOIA requests, memoirs of participants, and documents released in the *Foreign Relations* series. Definitive judgment on the nature and basis of US involvement, as opposed to the fact of involvement, must await further evidence.

The Eisenhower Administration placed a high value on psychological warfare, which sometimes entered into the field of intelligence. Under Eisenhower, the Operations Coordinating Board assumed the functions of the Psychological Strategy Board. C. D. Jackson conducted psychological strategy planning in the White House.

### Espionage and Communications Intelligence

The research and analysis aspects of the intelligence component of US foreign policy in the 1945-1954 period are gradually becoming visible. The historian can also perceive at least the gray outline of covert action and its role in overall strategy. Other critical areas of the intelligence equation are still essentially beyond unclassified reach. Intelligence literature on espionage and counterespionage after the war is substantial, yet fragmentary and unreliable. The works of John Barron and Harry Rositzke have brought together much of what is known about Soviet espionage and the KGB. David Martin's *Wilderness of Mirrors* on espionage and counterintelligence deals in part with 1945-1954. Military intelligence records at the National Archives and operational files of the OSS and its successors to late 1947, now being opened incrementally, may shed some light on the US-Soviet intelligence struggle in devastated Europe.

The Maclean and Philby cases remain a mystery of potentially supreme importance. Maclean participated in the work of the US-UK Combined Policy Committee in 1947 and 1948, thus having access to fundamental information on the dimensions of the US atomic energy program as it related to foreign policy. When Maclean defected in 1951, Dean Acheson is reported to have said "he knew everything." Philby, as British liaison to US intelligence, probably betrayed the Western attempt to overthrow the communist government of Albania and other top secret operations. Despite all that has been written about Burgess, Maclean, and Philby there remains uncertainty of what they actually conveyed to their Soviet superiors, the question of primary significance. *The Philby Conspiracy* by Page, Leitch, and Knightly makes a good effort to address this subject. The inscrutability of espionage does not diminish its importance. Allen Weinstein's treatment of the Hiss-Chambers case is evidence that use of interviews, Freedom of Information Act, and historical method can surmount the most murky and emotion-charged of research problems.

Still further beneath the surface lies the world of technical collection. The ULTRA secret remained intact for thirty years despite the end of the war, which entirely transformed the world situation and eroded the need for secrecy. The reality of the constant and intense communications intelligence battle of the first postwar decade comes to light only episodically as in the discovery of a microphone in the Great Seal plaque of US Ambassador George

Kennan in Moscow in 1952. Evidence indicates that US capabilities in communications intelligence declined after World War II with other intelligence activities, and were similarly revived and strengthened vastly with the outbreak of war in Korea. In early 1952 the Brownell Committee which included Charles Bolden, General John Magruder, and William H. Jackson drafted a report, now declassified, recommending centralization of COMINT activities. Implementation of the report resulted in the establishment of the National Security Agency. James Bamford's *The Puzzle Palace* sheds some light on NSA's antecedents and initial operations.

## Conclusion

Present evidence warrants two interrelated generalizations about US intelligence in the first postwar decade. First, it was essentially inadequate up to the outbreak of the Korean War and only began to assume its modern competence and configuration by about 1953. Second, the Central Intelligence Agency was established as part of the National Security Council system and operated within that structure. US intelligence improved and was more effectively used by policymakers as the NSC structure improved. At no time, even during its early period of disarray, did the CIA or intelligence community operate as an independent entity.

The integration of the intelligence component into the history of the first postwar decade is under way and will continue over an extended period. Much finished intelligence that was considered at the highest levels is now available. The historian's methodology must now be applied to it. One primary objective must be to produce a sort of Cold War sequel to Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War*, in the sense of determining with precision what the intelligence actually said, how policymakers used it, and what difference it made. Care must be taken to avoid assigning excessive importance to a few particular documents, but to consider the entire take before the policymaker.

Intelligence specialists ceaselessly remind us of the biases of consumers. The historian is also well advised to analyze the analysts, much as efforts have been made to assess the values and mentality of the Foreign Service. Was the intelligence professional of the first postwar decade experienced enough and realistic enough to estimate Stalin's intentions competently, as well as to accumulate factual knowledge?

Another consideration governing the study of intelligence and foreign policy is the fact that the documentation is seldom satisfactory. Information will become available incrementally. The interview, as applied by Powers in *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, may sometimes be the only possible source of evidence. Some instructions or policy statements conveyed orally may never be reconstructed. Other critical information obtained by sensitive means, and operational details of covert activities, are likely to remain classified for the foreseeable future in order to protect vital sources and methods. This must not deter the historian from proceeding with the study of intelligence.

There prevails today a myth of a golden age when historians had early and convenient access to essential documentation including intelligence material. There of course was no such age. The *Foreign Relations* series of World

War II scarcely mentions OSS. The standard treatments of the war were written in ignorance of ULTRA. By contrast, no nation, save as a result of defeat in war, has ever released so much so soon, willingly and otherwise, about its intelligence and intelligence related operations as has the postwar United States. Tremendous gaps remain, of course, some not soon to be filled.

George Constantinides points out in his recent intelligence bibliography, "experience teaches that in this field secrets spill out, now in droplets, now in gushes, which modify and at times alter entirely our previous comprehension of particular events" and that in view of this process of constant revision great tolerance and humility is needed in dealing with the world of intelligence.

For diplomatic historians, reinterpreting the first postwar decade in light of the intelligence component of policy will be exonerating, fascinating, and obligatory.



## SELECTED SOURCES

### I. Overviews, Bibliographies, and Finding Aids

Ray S. Chene, *The CIA: Recollections, Myths, and Functions* (Acropolis Books, 1982) is a candid autobiographical account by a top CIA analyst of the period who later served as Deputy Director of CIA and Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. With about 25 pages on 1945-1954, it is an important bridge between history and intelligence studies. Anne Kardeka's *History of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Laurel-Hall, Calif.: Aspen Park Press, 1977) is widely regarded as the best short treatment of CIA. Written as part of the Church Committee Report (Book IV), it is based in part on internal CIA documents. It deals only about 50 pages on 1945-1954. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1979) contains abundant information on 1945-1954, but it is scattered through the book. *Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* by William R. Corson (New York: Dial Press, 1977) is, contrary to the impression conveyed by its title, an important book containing about 450 pages on the period in question. Harry Howe Ransom's *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950) is a useful survey.

*Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography* by George C. Constantinides (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1983) permits identification of some 50 entries, of 500, that deal to some degree with 1945-1954. Comments on each item are helpful and reliable. Other important recent bibliographies include Paul W. Blackstock and Frank L. Schaff, Jr., *Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1978); Defense Intelligence School, *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, 7th edition (Washington, 1981); Marjorie W. Chene, et al., *A Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of the Russell F. Bowen Collection* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications, 1983), which constitutes a catalogue of an important source at Georgetown University; and Myron J. Smith, *The Secret Wars: Vol. II: Intelligence, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, Covert Operations, 1945-1980* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1981).

Vincent and Nan Buranelli, *Spy-Counterspy: An Encyclopedia of Intelligence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982) consists of sketches and suggestions for further reading on numerous prominent individuals and episodes.

The Declassified Documents Reference System, published by Carrollton Press and more recently by Research Publications, provides reference to and microfiche copies of thousands of documents released under the Freedom of Information Act since 1974, including numerous papers relating to intelligence. The system produces quarterly catalogs and retrospective guides. Many libraries have both the guides and microfiche copies of documents. Another finding aid for FOIA material is *Former Secrets: Government Records Made Public Through the Freedom of Information Act*, by Evan Hendricks (Washington: Campaign for Political Rights, 1982). It organizes material by subject, requester-author, and ultimate publication result. The Central Intelligence Agency, and to a lesser degree the Department of State, have the capability to identify and provide copies of documents already released on particular subjects. This enables the researcher to obtain material relatively rapidly without initiating a new FOIA request.

*The Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*, edited by Thomas F. Troy (Frederick, Md.: University Publications) is a bimonthly newsletter and book review that provides current information on the study of intelligence and new sources.

### II. Memoirs and Monographs

The memoirs of White House, State, and Defense policymakers of the period 1945-1954 are notably unhelpful for study of the intelligence component. President Truman comments on the dismemberment of OSS in *Year of Decision* (New York: Doubleday, 1955). *The Forrestal Diaries*, Walter Millis, ed. (New York: Viking) contain bits and pieces on intelligence organization. Dean Acheson's *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969) has a short chapter on organization for intelligence in 1946. George Kennan writes of the 1952 Moscow bugging incident in *Memoirs 1950-1963* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

Standard works by intelligence veterans providing theoretical concepts and defense of intelligence as an institution, but little hard factual information, include Allen W. Dulles, *The*

*History of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Sherman Kent, *Intelligence and American World Policy* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963); and Edwin B. Kirkpatrick, *The Real CIA* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

An outstanding work on transition from OSS to CIA is Thomas E. Froese, *Domination and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications, 1981). This notable administrative history was written as an official study within the Agency on a classified basis and subsequently released with minor exceptions. Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Basic Books, 1983) is a thoughtful and well-researched treatment of the subject. The story is told in brief by Tom Braden in "The Birth of the CIA," *American Heritage*, February 1977.

A new wave of memoirs by intelligence veterans has come forth since the mid 1970s, providing important information. A review article on this phenomenon appeared in the October 1979 issue of *Washingtonian*, "Old Boys Never Talk Until Now," by David Atlee Phillips. Intelligence memoirs pertinent to study of 1945-1954 include William F. Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), which sheds light on postwar activities in Western Europe; Cord Meyer, *Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), containing information on the effect of McCarthyism on intelligence; Peter De Silva, *Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Crisis of Intelligence* (New York: Times Books, 1978); Joseph Buckholder Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1976); David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977) which includes anecdotal information on intelligence in Latin America in the 1950s; Harry Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1977); and *The KGB—The Eyes of Russia* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981) each presenting over 100 pages on the intelligence struggle with the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1954 and Kermit Roosevelt's account of the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime. *Counterspy: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); William F. Langer's *In and Out of the Ivory Tower* (New York: Neale Watson Academic Publications, 1978) has disappointingly little on his service as head of the Office of National Estimates.

Secondary sources of special value on particular aspects of the period include John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate* (New York: Dial, 1982) which breaks new ground as an effort to evaluate US estimates of Soviet military strength by actually examining the documents. The study concentrates on the period after 1954, but also deals with earlier years employing MI's and other declassified material. In *The Puzzle Palace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), James Hancford uses interviews and FOIA to cast light on the National Security Agency, including its origins and early operations. Stephen Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981) has about 75 pages on 1945-1954, including chapters on Iran and Guatemala operations. Prominent among treatments of Guatemala based on recently declassified documents are Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1982); and Gordon L. Bowen, "US Foreign Policy Toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954," *Latin American Perspectives*, Winter, 1983, pp. 88-102. Blanche Wiesen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political Warfare* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981) treats Guatemala and other special operations. *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) by David C. Martin treats the East-West intelligence counterintelligence struggle over the years. John Barron's *KGB: The Secret Works of Soviet Secret Agents* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974) provides information on early postwar agents and a guide to additional study. William Hood, *Mole* (New York: Ballentine, 1982), an account of the Popov case by a former CIA officer, is a useful source on the espionage battle in Europe in the 1950s. *The Climate of Treason: Five Who Spied for Russia* by Andrew Boyle (London: Coronet Books, 1979) and Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, *The Philby Conspiracy* (New York: Doubleday, 1968) treat the Maclean and Philby cases. Allen Weinstein's *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Knopf, 1978) is a landmark example of historical method applied to the obscure and emotion-charged world of espionage.

Critiques of US intelligence containing vital information and insights on the 1945-1954 period but which must be read with caution include Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1974); and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964).

### III. Government Publications

*Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Department of State's official history of U.S. foreign affairs, contains little intelligence documentation prior to the volume for 1950. This is attributable in part to the unavailability of material to the editor, particularly the President's Secretary's File at the Truman Library. An exception was 1948 Vol. V, part 2, *The Near East and South Asia*, which includes a number of intelligence estimates on the Palestine situation. More finished intelligence appears in 1950 and 1951 volumes, such as 1950 Vol. VII, *Korea*. The triennial volumes for 1952-1954 contain substantial amounts of finished intelligence, particularly National Intelligence Estimates. For example, see 1952-1954 Vol. XIII, *Indochina*, and the recently released Vol. XV, *Korea*. Volume IV, *The American Republics*, presents extensive documentation on Guatemala, but less than scholars may have liked on U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Arbenz government.

The Pentagon Papers, *U.S. Department of Defense: U.S. Vietnam Relations, 1950-1968* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971) includes a number of NIEs and SNIEs for 1954 and earlier. The Gravel edition (Boston: Beacon, 1971) contains an after-action report on covert operations in Indochina, 1954-1955.

The 1955 Hoover Commission task force on intelligence, chaired by General Mark Clark, produced a report on the existing status of intelligence activities, *Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission: Intelligence Activities: A Report to Congress)* (Washington: GPO, 1955).

Jack Zlotnick's *National Intelligence* (Washington: GPO, 1960) prepared under the auspices of the US Industrial College of the Armed Forces, is a concise description of the US intelligence community as it existed in the early 1960s, with some treatment given to its development since 1945.

The report of the Brownell Committee to the Secretaries of State and Defense in 1952 that was instrumental in the establishment of the National Security Agency has been published as George A. Brownell, *The Origin and Development of the National Security Agency* (Lawrence Hills, Calif.: Aegean Park Press, 1981).

The report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission) (Washington: GPO, 1975) Appendices, Vol. VII, Appendix C, *Intelligence Functions Analyses*, contains information relating to 1945-1954.

Reports of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 1976 to 1980 contain occasional material pertinent to the 1945-1954 period. The same pertains to hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee). The final Report of the Church Committee (Senate Report No. 94-755) was released in November 1975 in six volumes, three of which are of special interest: Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*; Book IV, *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence and Military Intelligence*, containing the History of the CIA by Anne Karalekas; and Book VI, *Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities* which includes historical material on covert activities.

A judicious and well organized selection of congressional documentation generated by hearings from 1970 to 1976 is presented in Tyrus Fain, et al., eds. *The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues* (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1977).

### IV. Archival Sources

The Modern Military Branch of National Archives (NARS) presently has custody of nearly one thousand feet of OSS records which have been open for some time. This collection includes a small amount of postwar material of successor organizations. NARS is now receiving an additional three thousand feet of OSS operational records from CIA for 1941-1947, which are being processed and opened incrementally.

The National Security Agency has retired considerable World War II material, including intercepts. NSA records at NARS also include a series of "Special Research Histories," some of which deal in part with the postwar period.

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including some papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Intelligence Staff, have been released through 1990, but some specific documents much has been withheld. Records of the Office of Naval Intelligence are open through 1946.

War and Army Department records housed in the Military Field Branch of NARS at Suitland, Maryland include Plans and Operations Division files from 1946 to 1950 which contain some intelligence material. Records of the Army Military Information Division and Military Intelligence Service are open for research for the ~~war~~ postwar period. Records of U.S. Army theater commands also include intelligence documents.

Over eight thousand intelligence reports prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of OSs and by the Department of State through 1947 are arranged in a single file in the Executive and Diplomatic Branch. All the reports through 1947 have been declassified, but certain later items requested under FOIA. Little significant intelligence documentation is to be found in State Department decimal files; non-Secretary departmental office files dealing with postwar intelligence have been transferred to NARS.

Records of the National Security Council recently obtained by the Judicial, Legal, and Social Branch, while now in only the initial stage of declassification review, and certainly no substitute for collections at Independence and Abilene, do provide access to intelligence materials such as numbered NSC reports NSC 40, NSC 50, and NSC 54E2.

The United States Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., has custody of the personal papers of General William Donovan, comprising some three hundred boxes. This collection includes some postwar documents. The Institute also administers the personal papers of many prominent postwar Army officers which contain widely scattered intelligence-related documentation.

The Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Mo., offers perhaps the richest source of largely unexploited postwar intelligence material now available to historians. The primary pertinent collection is the President's Secretary's File, particularly a fourteen-box intelligence file. The PSF collection contains hundreds of intelligence reports, many of which are stamped "Copy No. 1, President of the United States." Categorical reports include Current Intelligence Bulletins, ORF's Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), and CIA. CIA Reviews of the World Situation, National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, reports of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Daily Korean Summaries and other Korean War intelligence, and memos from Director of Central Intelligence ~~Dulles~~ to President Truman on particular issues. The PSF file also contains intelligence records of an organizational and administrative nature. The PSF National Security Council files, including the almost entirely declassified records of NSC meetings, provide a unique window on the role of intelligence in the national security process. The White House Central Files have an important file on General Donovan and the origins of the CIA.

The intelligence sources at the Eisenhower Library are enormously rich, but less concentrated than those of the Truman Library. Despite the release of considerable documentation for the *Foreign Relations* series and under Freedom of Information, including National Intelligence Estimates and information on operations in Iran and Guatemala, much remains unavailable. Intelligence documentation is widespread in the national security-related collections of the Library, including the National Security Council records of the Eisenhower Papers as President (Whitman File), the Files of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the files of the Office of the Staff Secretary. Intelligence materials are dispersed according to subject through the DDE Diaries, the John Foster Dulles collection, and the White House Central Files. The records of the Operations Coordinating Board and the C. D. Jackson collections are important for psychological strategy matters.